Determining capacity to make medical treatment decisions : problems implementing the Mental Capacity Act 2005. by Cave,  Emma
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
24 November 2014
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Cave, Emma (2015) 'Determining capacity to make medical treatment decisions : problems implementing the
Mental Capacity Act 2005.', Statute law review., 36 (1). pp. 86-106.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmu034
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Statute Law Review following
peer review. The version of record Cave, Emma (2014) 'Determining Capacity to Make Medical Treatment Decisions:
Problems Implementing the Mental Capacity Act 2005', Statute Law Review, 36, 1, 86-106 is available online at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmu034.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
1 
 
This article’s original place of publication is Emma Cave ‘Determining Capacity to Make Medical 
Treatment Decisions: Problems Implementing the Mental Capacity Act 2005’ Statute Law Review 
2014; doi: 10.1093/slr/hmu034 
This is a pre-print version. The published version of this article is available at: 
http://slr.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/11/20/slr.hmu034.full.pdf+html?sid=6f5d6547-
e731-4cec-ac99-7eaf6a12e5a7 
Determining Capacity to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: 
Problems Implementing The Mental Capacity Act 2005 
Emma Cave*   
Abstract 
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 sets out a ground-breaking statutory framework to empower and 
protect vulnerable people who are incapable of making their own decisions. The Act incorporates 
empowering and safeguarding measures, but the balance between the two is precarious. The Act 
was scrutinised in a House of Lords Select Committee report in 2014, which concluded that, whilst 
the principles of the Act are well supported, a raft of measures is urgently needed to improve poor 
understanding and implementation of the empowering ethos of the Act. Some people who are 
capable of supported decision-making are instead subjected to the decisions of others. The Act is 
one of a number of laws governing decisions to consent to and refuse medical treatment. As 
problematic as the failure to comply with the terms of the Act is the exclusion of some groups 
from its remit. Implementation of the Act, and compliance of our laws with human rights (and the 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in particular), is dependent upon a 
broader commitment to empowerment. This article considers how this might be achieved. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In England and Wales, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) and accompanying Code of Practice set 
out a test for mental incapacity and safeguards for the treatment of adults and 16/17 year olds who 
are found to lack capacity. The Act applies to health, welfare and financial decisions, but in this 
paper, I will focus on medical treatment decisions. The MCA attempts to balance safeguarding of 
vulnerable people and their empowerment to make decisions for themselves. Not all agree that this 
is a worthwhile pursuit. Conly1, for example, argues that legal capacity is a flawed mechanism for 
determining who should and should not be allowed to make harmful choices. It is incapable, she 
argues of differentiating between rational and irrational choices.2 She suggests that hard 
paternalism may be justified to protect people from irrational decisions. The MCA, however, takes a 
different stance, aiming to protect the right of those capable of making the decision in question to 
do so and reserving paternalistic measures for those who cannot. 
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1
 S. Conly, Against Autonomy: Justifying Coercive Paternalism (Cambridge, 2012). 
2
 Conly, ibid, 5: ‘[O]nce again this proves to be less than an entirely clear division – surely some of us who are 
generally competent have, at times, thought in just those ways that are typical of the incompetent’. 
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Section 1 sets out the core principles at the heart of the legislation: the right to make decisions for 
oneself is protected by an assumption of capacity; a right to support; and a right to make decisions 
that others consider to be unwise. The assumption of capacity3 is rebuttable only where the 
individual has an impairment of the mind or brain and is unable to understand, retain, use or 
communicate the information needed to make the particular decision.4 Where the assumption is 
rebutted, the ‘best interest test’5 applies in which case others make a decision on the individual’s 
behalf, by the least restrictive option, taking into consideration the person’s past and present 
wishes, feelings, values and beliefs.6  
In March 2014, a review of the Act by a House of Lords Select Committee7 reported that the Act’s 
core principles are well supported, but the Act is not working as intended.8 There are, the 
Committee found, misperceptions regarding the application of the five core principles of the Act.9  
The sharp legal distinction between capacity and incapacity defies the reality that there is often a 
grey area between them.10 There is evidence of a lack of commitment to the empowerment and 
enablement11 promised in the statute.  
The Select Committee was not the first to point out the gap between theory and practice. Contrary 
to the assumption of capacity in the MCA,12 a 2012 study commissioned by the Policy Research 
Programme in the Department of Health showed that a significant number of decisions are made in 
the best interests of a patient without ever assessing mental capacity.13  The Select Committee found 
evidence of confusion as to which decisions require a formal assessment,14 particularly where 
treatment is consensual.15 Where assessments are made, they are sometimes of poor quality, or are 
not recorded.16 Many decisions seem to be predicated on the fact that the patient is at risk of harm. 
Conversely, the Select Committee heard evidence that the assumption of mental capacity can be 
used perversely – to justify non-assessment or inaction, leaving vulnerable people at risk.17  
The 2012 study also demonstrated confusion surrounding the application of the test for mental 
capacity. The Act requires that the test is applied in relation to the particular decision or task, rather 
                                                          
3
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 1(2). 
4
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, ss 2, 3. 
5
 Set out in Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 4. 
6
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 4(6). 
7
 Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, Mental Capacity Act 2005: Post-Legislative Scrutiny, HL 
Paper 139, (March 2014). 
8
 Ibid, paras 2, 104.  
9
 Select Committee (n7), chapter 3. 
10
 M.I. Hall, ‘Mental Capacity in the (Civil) Law: Capacity, Autonomy and Vulnerability’ (2012) 58(1) McGill Law 
Journal 61. 
11
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, ss 1(3), 3(2), 4(4). 
12
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 1(2): ‘A person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that he 
lacks capacity.’ 
13
 V. Williams, G. Boyle, M. Jepson, P. Swift, T. Williamson, P. Heslop, Making Best Interests Decisions: People 
and Processes (Bristol, Bradford, 2012), 6: ‘1:10 best interests decisions did not follow an assessment that the 
person lacked capacity’. 
14
 Select Committee (n7), para 74. 
15
 Ibid, para 75. 
16
 Ibid, para 66. 
17
 Ibid, para 63. 
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than to the person, yet: 18 ‘Around one quarter of the best interests decisions studied were made on 
the basis of a capacity assessment relating to history, diagnosis or disability, age, appearance or 
behaviour, or the fact that someone was making an unwise decision.’ 19 One of the MCA principles is 
that ‘A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he makes an unwise 
decision’,20  but it is apparent that, in practice, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish an unwise 
decision from a lack of functional ability to make a decision.21     
The Select Committee also reports poor compliance22 with the MCA requirement that: ‘A person is 
not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all practicable steps to help him to do so have 
been taken without success.’23 The Act focuses on both safeguarding and empowerment, but in 
practice the former dominates.  Too often, capacity is not assumed; incapacity is not assessed; 
unwise decisions are seen as evidence of incapacity; and too little is done to support individuals to 
make a capax decision. Individuals who fall into the grey area between capacity and incapacity are 
too readily assigned to the latter group.  
The Lords Select Committee made 39 recommendations addressing these and a range of other 
issues not covered in this article.24 The Committee also made proposals for reform, some of which 
the Government intend to take forward.25 The Committee’s emphasis on the practical interpretation 
and implementation of the MCA is admirable. This article adds an appreciation of the broader 
scheme of laws relevant to medical treatment decisions and their impact on the MCA 
implementation agenda. The Select Committee’s remit was restricted to an evaluation of the Mental 
Capacity Act. It did not consider the different rules that apply to those under 16 and to people with 
psychosocial disorders. These laws are increasingly controversial in light of modern interpretations 
of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which moves towards a rights based 
approach centered on the evolving capacities of the child; and the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which embodies a shift away from a social welfare response to 
disability, to a rights based approach. This article considers the interaction of the MCA with other 
laws governing medical treatment decisions. Philosophical and human rights developments point to 
flaws in the ability of the MCA to fulfil its original remit. Furthermore, the argument is put forward 
that the incoherent principles applicable in laws which, in practice, may overlap and interact, is a 
contributory factor in the failure to implement the facilitative ethos of the MCA. This article 
considers the implications and options in light of a political resistance to radically reform the 
capacity framework in England and Wales, arguing that it is becoming increasingly important to 
deliver upon and extend the promises made in the MCA.  
                                                          
18
 V. Williams et al (n13), 7. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s. 1(4). 
21
 V. Williams et al (n13), 6. 
22
 Select Committee, (n7), para 5 and 107. 
23
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 1(3).  
24
 This article does not, for example, consider the controversial issues surrounding the Mental Capacity Act 
Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards, which came into effect on 1st April 2009 and provide for the lawful 
deprivation of liberty of those people who lack the capacity to consent to arrangements made in their best 
interests. 
25
 HM Government, Valuing Every Voice, Respecting Every Right: Making the Case for the Mental Capacity Act 
Cm 8884 (June 2014). 
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The article is in 3 sections. First it reviews the laws on capacity in relation to medical treatment and 
argues that the MCA does not address the issues it was designed to resolve. Not only, in practice, is 
the promise to support people to make their own decisions poorly implemented,26 but there are 
groups of people whose decisions regarding medical treatment are vetoed by virtue of their status, 
despite their ability to make an autonomous decision. The second section contends that this is one 
of a number of factors that limit the proper implementation of the MCA. In the final section, the 
article considers ways forward.  
II IS THE LAW ON CAPACITY FIT FOR PURPOSE? 
The MCA was a long time in the framing. The Law Commission’s 1995 report on Mental Incapacity 
set out the problems the legislation sought to address: 
It is widely recognised that, in this area, the law as it now stands is unsystematic and full of 
glaring gaps. It does not rest on clear or modern foundations of principle. It has failed to 
keep up with social and demographic changes. It has also failed to keep up with 
developments in our understanding of the rights and needs of those with mental disability.27 
The result was liberal, progressive, rights based28 and much praised, and there remains considerable 
support for its core principles. But rights have developed and social change continues apace.  In the 
next section, the legislation is assessed against each of these pre-Mental Capacity Act criticisms in 
order to show that, whilst the Act might initially have resolved these issues to the satisfaction of 
many, the criticisms are once again applicable.  
A. The law is unsystematic and full of glaring gaps. 
The first criticism of the pre-MCA law was that it was ‘unsystematic and full of glaring gaps’. Seven 
years since the MCA came into force, there are a number of prominent gaps resulting in differential 
treatment of people capable of making an autonomous treatment decision.  Gaps in the law as 
applied (that is, the failure to apply the Act’s principles) have already been referred to. Whether 
gaps in the law as written are ‘unsystematic’ depends on whether the restricted remit of the Act is 
considered justifiable. This sub-section outlines the limited reach of the MCA. Subsequent sub-
sections argue that certain status-based denials of capacity are becoming increasingly difficult to 
defend given developments in modern principle; the human rights implications; and the practical 
impact they may have on the implementation of the MCA.  
One of the aims of the MCA is to limit paternalistic decision-making to those cases where a person 
lacks capacity (as defined in the Act). However, the public interest in protecting vulnerable groups 
from their own harmful decisions has resulted in a number of exceptions to the general principle. 
These exceptions are controversial where the patient is in fact capable of making an autonomous 
treatment decision, or when they are discriminatory in nature. The exceptions can be categorised 
into three groups.   
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 Select Committee (n7), paras 2, 104. 
27
 Law Commission, Mental Incapacity (1995), para 1.1. 
28
 M. Donnelly, ‘Best interests, Patient Participation and the Mental Capacity Act 2005’ (2009) 17 Medical Law 
Review 1, 14. 
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Firstly, other tests for capacity may operate alongside the test set out in the statute. In 2012 it was 
confirmed that the statutory test for capacity is not exhaustive. The court’s inherent jurisdiction to 
protect vulnerable people whose capacity is compromised by reason of coercion or undue influence, 
constraint or ‘other disabling circumstances’ was affirmed in DL v A Local Authority and others.29  DL, 
it was held, had mental capacity under the Mental Capacity Act but not at common law. The case 
concerned decisions about residence and contact, but the same reasoning could apply to medical 
treatment decisions. The Court of Appeal was clear that the common law should sit harmoniously 
alongside the MCA test and should not be applied so as to subvert the will of parliament.30 
Nonetheless, to recognise that a person has capacity under the MCA only to remove it at common 
law has understandably proved controversial.31  
A comparable situation arises in relation to medical treatment decisions made by minors aged 
16/17. Much of the Act applies to those 16 and over, but the MCA Code of Practice recognises that 
whilst some 16/17 year olds might lack capacity due to an impairment of the mind or brain (so as to 
satisfy the test for incapacity in section 2), others will be ‘unable to make the decision for some 
other reason’ in which case they ‘should be assessed under common law principles’.32 For both 
16/17 year olds and adults who are subject to undue influence, a decision that is recognised as capax 
under the MCA framework might nonetheless be viewed incapax at common law.  
Secondly, there are situations where the capacity regime applies, but the link between capacity and 
authoritative decision-making is broken when certain conditions apply. The Mental Health Act 1983 
(MHA) governs compulsory treatment of both young people and adults with mental disorder. As we 
shall see, a capax refusal might be overridden to protect third parties or, more controversially, the 
patient. Similarly, at common law, there are circumstances in which competent refusals of treatment 
by minors under the age of 18 can be overruled in their best interests.33   
Thirdly, some people are excluded from the remit of the Act. In such cases, the fact that a patient 
would be recognised as having capacity under the MCA might nonetheless result in a finding of 
incapacity because a different test, with a higher threshold for capacity is applied. This is the case in 
relation to minors under the age of 16, who must demonstrate Gillick competence34 if they are to 
give a valid consent to medical treatment. There is no requirement to facilitate capacity.35 The test is 
                                                          
29
 DL v A Local Authority and others [2012] EWCA Civ 253, [78]. Discussed in E. Cave, ‘Goodbye Gillick? 
Identifying and Resolving Problems with the Concept of Child Competence’ (2014) 34(1) Legal Studies 103, 
120-121. 
30
 DL ibid, [48], citing Munby J in Re PS (An Adult) [2007] EWHC 623, [119].  
31
 B. Hewson, ‘Neither Midwives Nor Rainmakers: Why DL is Wrong’ (2013) Public Law 451; G.T. Laurie, J.K. 
Mason, ‘Trust of Contract: How Far Does Contemporary Doctor / Patient Relationship Protect and Promote 
Autonomy?’ in Festschrift for Sheila McLean, forthcoming, chapter 17. 
32
 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice (2007), para 12.13. 
33
 Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64; An NHS Foundation Hospital v P 
[2014] EWHC 165. 
34
 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112. 
35
 E. Cave, ‘Maximisation of a Minors’ Capacity’ (2011) 4 Child and Family Law Quarterly, 429. And see 
evidence of this in F (Mother) v F (Father) [2013] EWHC 2683 (Fam), discussed in E. Cave, ‘Adolescent Refusal 
of MMR inoculation’ (2014) 77(4) Modern Law Review 619. 
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vague and in some cases involving the refusal of life-sustaining treatment, the threshold applied has 
been considerably higher than that applied to adults.36   
The MCA was intended to provide a ‘single comprehensive piece of legislation making provisions for 
people who lack capacity’.37 Hailed as a success when it was enacted, some of the exceptions that 
might once have been readily justified according to the prevalent charitable approach, must now be 
reconsidered in light of human rights developments. Where differential treatment is inconsistent 
with human rights then the pre-MCA criticism that the law was ‘full of glaring gaps’ might once again 
apply. 
B. The law has failed to keep up with human rights developments and the needs of those with 
mental disability 
The Law Commission was critical of the failures of the pre-MCA law to ‘keep up with human rights 
developments’, which unsurprisingly have not ceased since the Act came into force.   The emphasis 
in the MCA on individual autonomy rights was liberal and progressive.  It accorded with judicial 
recognition of autonomy interests38 and their evolution39 into autonomy rights.40 There is no 
mention of autonomy in the European Convention on Human Rights, but the Convention is a living 
document and the right has been acknowledged and applied by the European Court of Human 
Rights, as part of the suite of protections encompassed in the Article 8(1) right to a private and 
family life.41 Compulsory medical treatment has potential to breach (amongst other rights) Article 
8(1). Once this Article is ‘engaged’, the State bears the burden of demonstrating that breach falls 
within one of the exceptions in Article 8(2) and that it is in accordance with law and necessary in a 
democratic society. Article 8(2) might be invoked to protect vulnerable people from their own 
harmful decisions on the basis that they lack capacity or otherwise lack decision-making authority.42 
This position accords with J.S. Mill’s proviso to his oft-quoted harm principle:43 ‘It is, perhaps, hardly 
necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their 
faculties.’44 But vulnerability is a social construct and its accepted definition is subject to change, as 
is the societal response to the identification of vulnerability. J.S. Mill stated:  
                                                          
36
 Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386; Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick 
Competence) [1998] 2 FLR 810. 
37
 Law Commission (n27). 
38
 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821 at 866. 
39
 Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41, [92] per Lord Walker: ‘the importance of personal autonomy has been 
more and more widely recognised.’  
40
 Chester, ibid, [87] per Lord Hope: ‘The function of the law [on informed consent] is to protect the patient’s 
right to choose.’  
41
 Eg Pretty v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1, [61]; Ternovszky v Hungary (Application no. 67545/09, Judgment of 10 
December 2010, [22]. See also KH and Others v Slovakia, (Application no. 32881/04), Judgment of 28 April 
2009; Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow and Others v Russia, (Application no. 302/02), Judgment of 10 June 
2010; Schneiter v Switzerland (Application no. 63063/00), Judgment of 31 March 2005; X v Finland (Application 
no. 34806/04), Judgment of 3 July 2012. 
42
 See for example, R (on the application of PS) v (1) Responsible Medical Officer (Dr G) (2) Second Opinion 
Appointed Doctor (Dr W) [2003] EWHC 2335 Admin, where compulsory treatment for mental disorder against 
the will of an adult with capacity was held to be justified under Article 8(2). 
43
 J.S. Mill, On Liberty (London, 1969), p. 72. ‘... the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised 
over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.’ 
44
 J.S. Mill ibid. 
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We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as 
that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of 
by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. For 
the same reason, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in 
which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage.45 
 
Aspects of Mill’s proviso are inapplicable today. Similarly, developments in human rights lead us to 
question  the position on vulnerability adopted in the framework of laws that apply to medical 
treatment decisions. This section focuses on two groups in particular - those with psychosocial 
disabilities and young people - and considers the claim that a denial of capacity flows from their 
status. 
Young people 
Rebuttable presumptions of capacity apply to 16 and 17 year olds under both the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005 and the Family Law Reform Act 1969. However, the dual application of the Acts potentially 
enables the presumption to be rebutted in a wider set of circumstances than would apply to an adult 
under the MCA. It has been held at common law that section 8(3) of Family Law Reform Act 1969 
preserves the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to overrule a refusal of treatment which is 
contrary to the minor’s interests (because treatment is needed to preserve life).46  
The capacity test that applies to under 16 year olds requires that understanding is measured and 
tested, not facilitated and enabled.47 A test set down by Lord Scarman in Gillick v West Norfolk Area 
Health Authority48 recognises as competent, decisions made by those minors who have ‘sufficient 
understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed’.49 Minors 
who fall into this bracket can give the legal authority for medical treatment provided it is in their 
best interests to do so. The threshold for competence to refuse (particularly life-sustaining) 
treatment, however, has been set so high as to be arguably impossible to achieve50 or denied 
altogether.51 The resulting lack of symmetry between the right to consent and the right to refuse 
treatment has been much maligned.52 Hagger argues that greater weight should be attached to 
children’s autonomy, by empowering minors as decision-makers. The best way to achieve this, she 
argues, is through a human rights framework.53 The UK signed the UN Convention of the Rights of 
the Child in 1990, ratified it in 1991 and it came into force in 1992. Article 12 requires that children’s 
views should be heard and given due weight. The ‘evolving capacities approach’ taken in Article 1254 
                                                          
45
 J.S. Mill ibid, p. 73. 
46
 Re W (n33). 
47
 Discussed in E. Cave, (n29), 106-107. 
48
 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112. 
49
 Ibid, 253. 
50
 Re E (n36); Re L (n36).  
51
 Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Medical Treatment) [1992] Fam 11. 
52
 Critics are summarised and analysed in S. Gilmore, J. Herring, ‘‘No’ is the Hardest Word: Consent and 
Children’s Autonomy’ (2011) 23 Child and Family Law Quarterly 3, 4. 
53
 L. Hagger, The Child as Vulnerable Patient: Protection and Empowerment (Ashgate, 2009).  
54
 Article 12 ‘(1) States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right 
to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in 
accordance with the age and maturity of the child. (2) For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided 
8 
 
arguably goes further than our current law in its commitment to hearing and heeding the views of 
the minor. There is evidence that some judges are starting to embrace a rights based approach,55 but 
20-year-old legal precedents that adopt a paternalistic stance56 have yet to be challenged. Where 
minors are capable of making an autonomous decision (and clearly not all children are), the vague 
test for competence enables the threshold to vary according to the outcome of the decision. I have 
argued elsewhere that this has potential to breach the human rights of minors.57 
 
Psychosocial disability 
Across the world, people with psychosocial disabilities suffer considerable human rights abuses.58 
Accounts of people left chained to their beds and subjected to forced treatment regimens are by no 
means confined to the history books. In Europe, controversial treatments such as ‘mega-dosing’ 
(giving doses beyond the recommendations), psychosurgery and sterilisation are particularly 
problematic when they are administered without consent.  These are practices that may conflict 
with the European Convention on Human Rights prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment 
(Article 3) and with rights to liberty (Article 5) and to a private and family life (Article 8 and also 
Article 6 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine).59 There are widespread concerns 
about compulsion in the treatment of mental health conditions60 but this section is confined to the 
potential inequality that flows from legal recognition that treatment can be imposed on individuals 
to protect them from harm, even though they have mental capacity. People with psychosocial 
disabilities might claim a lack of equality before the law, but as we shall see, legal equality is a 
contested concept.61 
The MHA 198362 steers a careful line between protection of the individual’s autonomy interests and 
protection of others. Amongst safeguards introduced in the Mental Health Act 2007 (which amends 
the 1983 Act), the definition of ‘mental disorder’ was revised63 to limit the range of people who can 
be subjected to compulsory treatment under the Act, and section 3(4) of the 1983 Act now 
incorporates into the detention criteria a requirement that ‘appropriate treatment is available’ for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child ….’ And see 
CRPD, Article 7(3): ‘States Parties shall ensure that children with disabilities have the right to express their 
views freely on all matters affecting them, their views being given due weight in accordance with their age and 
maturity, on an equal basis with other children, and to be provided with disability and age-appropriate 
assistance to realize that right.’ 
55
 R (Axon) v Secretary of State for Health [2006] EWHC 37 (Admin). 
56
 Re R (n51); Re W (n33). 
57
 E. Cave, (n29). 
58
 S. Wildeman, ‘Protecting Rights and Building Capacities: Challenges to Global Mental Health Policy in Light of 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2013) 41(1) The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 
48. 
59
 B. Hale, ‘Justice and Equality in Mental Health Law: The European Experience’ (2007) 30(1) International 
Journal of Law and Psychiatry 18; L.O. Gostin, ‘Human Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities. The European 
Convention of Human Rights’ (2000) 23(2) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 125. 
60
 P. Bartlett, ‘A Matter of Necessity? Enforced Treatment under the Mental Health Act’ (2007) 15(1) Medical 
Law Review 86. 
61
 A. Kampf, ‘Coercive Care: The Role of the Law in Treatment Decisions’ in B. Mcsherry, I. Freckelton (eds) 
Coercive Care: Rights, Law and Policy (Routledge, 2013), 80. 
62
 As amended by the Mental Health Act 2007 and the Health and Social Care Act 2012. 
63
 Amending Mental Health Act 1983, s 1(2). 
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the patient concerned.  A new section 58A requires that - except in an emergency - patients with 
capacity consent before electro-convulsive therapy (and certain other treatments) are administered.  
Part 4 of the MHA, however, permits treatment without consent. And section 63,64 which allows 
treatment of ‘mental disorder’ even where the patient makes a competent refusal, is not confined to 
cases where patients pose a risk to others.65 Bartlett has argued that this ‘throw[s] to the wind any 
concept of autonomy for the civilly or criminally confined psychiatric patient.’66 The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and its Optional Protocol has brought 
about a paradigm shift in disability rights.67 The Convention was adopted in 2006 and brought into 
force in 2008. The UK is one of 82 signatories. Though the Act is not directly enforceable in the UK 
courts, it has interpretive influence. The Convention protects equality and non-discrimination 
(Article 5), liberty and security of persons (Article 14) and dignity (freedom from inhuman and 
degrading treatment) (Article 15). Article 12 promotes the right of persons with disabilities to ‘enjoy 
legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life’68 and to appropriate measures of 
support in exercising legal capacity69 in line with their ‘will and preferences’.70 Traditionally, mental 
health was viewed as an isolated issue requiring a tailored response. The Convention, however, 
explicitly incorporates mental disabilities within its remit.71  There is a drive to separate the concept 
from purely medical terms and recognise the psychological and social interactions inherent in the 
term. Many now refer to ‘psychosocial disability’ rather than ‘mental disorder’. As a result, basing 
differential freedoms and rights on the distinction between physical and mental disorder is 
becoming increasingly problematic. At the heart of the problem is the fact that the CRPD adopts a 
social model of disability that contrasts with the medical model inherent in MHA. The current regime 
has potential to breach rights to equality both by discriminating against those with cognitive 
impairment and by excluding from the remit of the Mental Capacity Act (and subjecting their 
decisions to override), groups who are considered vulnerable.  
In summary, the previous two sub-sections have shown that there are gaps in the framework on 
capacity and human rights arguments challenging their acceptability. Another criticism of pre-MCA 
law by the 1995 Law Commission was that ‘it does not rest on clear or modern foundations of 
principle’ and ‘has failed to keep up with social and demographic change’. It is to this we now turn. 
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C. The law does not rest on clear or modern foundations of principle and has failed to keep up 
with social and demographic change 
Since the MCA came into force, ‘modern foundations of principle’ have indeed developed.   The 
previous sub-section postulated that the legal framework may not adequately protect the individual 
autonomy rights of those excluded from the remit of the MCA. This section recounts recent criticism 
of the individual autonomy approach and argues that, in light of contemporary philosophical 
developments it is becoming increasingly important to deliver upon the concessions in the Act to a 
relational account.   
Relational Autonomy 
The focus of the MCA is on those who lack capacity, but its empowering ethos, assumption of 
capacity and its restricted application of the best interests test to those who, on the balance of 
probabilities lack capacity, also provide important safeguards for those with capacity. Individual 
autonomy interests dominate insofar as the decisions of adults recognised as having capacity under 
the Act will generally prevail even where decisions are unwise, irrational and will lead to significant 
harm or death.72 The Act adopts a procedural notion of individual autonomy, separating the process 
of making the decision from the content of the decision.  This has potential to generate 
unwillingness amongst doctors to challenge capax decisions that are irrational, ill-thought out and 
will lead to considerable harm, which is problematic to rational choice theorists.   
It is also at odds with the increasing prominence of relational accounts in contemporary 
philosophical debate which recognise that the procedural test, which focuses on individual decision-
making, defies the clinical reality that most patients make decisions in conjunction with their doctors 
and families. Also, the emphasis on individual autonomy results in a preoccupation with the 
outcome of the decision. Critiques of individual autonomy and of consent as a mechanism of 
achieving and protecting it, 73 shift the focus to a consideration of the process by which the decision 
is made. A decision that is ultimately overruled, may have involved every effort to improve the 
patient’s understanding and aid communication. It might have involved consultation with family 
members and efforts to persuade the patient to accept a course of action which is commensurate 
with optimum health. Or it may have involved none of these things. Viewed in isolation, the 
acceptance or rejection of a patient’s decision is of limited significance. The Act’s focus on individual 
autonomy can lead to a simplistic binary interpretation of capacity, which removes the incentive for 
discussion and thus for empowerment: 74 If a person makes what doctors consider an unwise refusal 
of treatment, capacity is assessed to determine whether or not that decision can be overridden in 
the patient’s best interests. A finding of capacity renders the decision unassailable. It is not the job 
of the doctor to question it. A finding of incapacity, on the other hand, renders the decision subject 
to veto. The decision of another person is substituted for the decision of the patient.  
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Individual autonomy has traditionally dominated medical law and this has had a profound  effect on 
medical practice. As O’Neill has said: ‘…demands that medical professionals respect autonomy and 
rights have become a constant refrain’.75 Hall has argued that this is the result of ‘mainstream liberal 
culture [projecting the] crude figure of the autonomous man’.76 The focus on individual autonomy 
has caused to be overlooked the engagement, facilitation, discourse, constrained options, and 
power differentials which influence the doctor-patient relationship and ultimately the decision of 
whether or not to have treatment. Criticism of the pre-eminence of individual autonomy in medical 
law in general and capacity in particular, is mounting.  For example, Fineman77 challenges the 
fixation in law on individual autonomy and argues that the State should be more responsive to 
vulnerability. Autonomy, Fineman argues, is a result rather than a naturally occurring phenomenon. 
The State should focus on non-authoritarian measures to empower vulnerable people, rather than 
delineating the autonomous and non-autonomous – a delineation that, she argues, is built on myths.  
 
Concession to relational autonomy 
The MCA does make concessions to protecting relational autonomy interests insofar as the Act 
recognises the ‘social embeddedness’ of some individuals’ routes to capacity. The MCA provides that 
some people should be helped to make their own decisions: the Act incorporates a duty to take ‘all 
practicable steps to help’78 individuals achieve capacity. A broad understanding of relational 
autonomy (as recognition that an individual’s ability to make decisions is connected to his or her 
relationships with others)  is not the antithesis of individual autonomy, but can be utilised to ensure 
that those capable of exercising an individual autonomy right (the right to decide) are empowered to 
do so. 
The MCA’s concessions to a relational approach focus on enablement and the relevance of the 
person’s past and present views when making a decision in their best interests, but they are poorly 
implemented. The legislation is not currently living up to its promises to protect and promote even 
this limited conception of relational autonomy. The dominance of individual autonomy in the law on 
informed consent emphasised and accentuated the potential within the MCA as framed to prioritise 
individual autonomy interests. In practice, this has resulted in a stark delineation between those 
with and without capacity and deprioritised efforts to help people achieve capacity. In recent times, 
the weakening of the hegemony of individual autonomy and increasing recognition of the 
importance of the relational autonomy approach has resulted in additional scrutiny of the promises 
in the Act to facilitate capacity, and the Act has been found wanting.  
In relation to vulnerable groups who are, to various extents, denied the protections of the MCA, the 
incorporation of relational accounts of autonomy is highly variable.  The requirement of 
‘enablement’ may be poorly delivered by the MCA, but it does not necessarily apply at all beyond 
the remit of the Act. The Select Committee’s faith in the MCA framework as a means of balancing 
safeguarding and empowerment may be misplaced. Limitations flow from the framing of the Act and 
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from its interaction in clinical practice with laws that prioritise safeguarding irrespective of the 
individual’s potential to make a supported decision. 
The aim in this sub-section has not been to adjudicate the debates between relational and individual 
accounts of autonomy, but to point out that ‘modern foundations of principle’ have developed since 
the MCA came into force and that these developments make it increasingly important to recognise 
in law and practice that the capacity for self-governance is socially embedded and that 
empowerment and facilitation play an increasingly prominent role in protecting autonomy rights.  
 
II  IMPLEMENTING THE MCA 
The Law Commission’s 1995 report on Mental Incapacity recommended that legislation was needed 
to address a regime that was ‘unsystematic and full of glaring gaps’; did not ‘rest on clear or modern 
foundations of principle’ and ‘failed to keep up with social and demographic change’; and which has 
‘failed to keep up with developments in our understanding of the rights and needs of those with 
mental disability’.79 The first section has recounted arguments that these criticisms remain valid in 
relation to the framework on capacity that applies to medical treatment decisions.  Whilst there are 
strong public policy grounds for protecting some vulnerable people from their own harmful 
decisions, the failure to apply the principles of empowerment and facilitation central to the MCA and 
the denial of capacity on the basis of status leads to pressure for reform.  
The dominance of individual autonomy and charitable paternalism is giving way to a more nuanced 
approach which incorporates a relational approach and protects equality rights. The MCA makes 
concessions to both, but dictatorial and authoritative decisions on the basis of an individual’s 
‘vulnerability’ and differential recognition of rights on the basis of status are increasingly 
problematic in light of the ‘paradigm shift’ in the CRPD from charitable and medical approaches to 
disability to a human rights based approach.  Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights now 
recognises that people are vulnerable by virtue of the discrimination they suffer.80 Consequently, the 
paradigm shift is relevant not only to those with a disability but also to other vulnerable groups. 
Furthermore, enforceability is enhanced by the increased recognition of equality rights in the 
European Court of Human Rights, ‘allowing the Court to address different aspects of inequality in a 
more substantive manner’.81 
The lack of consistency in the principles that lie behind capacity laws relevant to medical treatment 
decisions is likely to compound the difficulties acknowledged by the Select Committee in 
implementing the MCA.  So far, the focus in this paper has been on the conceptual problems that 
flow from having a definition of capacity that is not applicable to certain groups on the basis of their 
status, and denies some people who are recognised as having legal capacity the right to refuse 
treatment. It is worth noting that this also leads to practical problems for patients, families and 
doctors. One such problem flows from the complexity of the various laws, which makes it difficult to 
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know and assert rights or to challenge decisions. Another is the incongruous and incoherent ways in 
which the various tests come together. A 15 year old with anorexia nervosa might, in the space of a 
year, have to satisfy two different tests to determine capacity and be subject to veto regardless of 
capacity if her doctor chooses to invoke the MHA rather than the MCA regime. It is not always clear 
which is the more appropriate. The Court of Protection (a special section of the Court created by the 
MCA) recently ruled that a patient suffering from anorexia nervosa lacked capacity and could be 
subjected to compulsory treatment in her best interests.82 The treatment would be authorised under 
the MHA where different principles apply, potentially leading to conflicts between the two 
regimes.83  
The fact that the MCA focuses on the protection of individual autonomy interests  leaves the 
broader regime open to criticism on the basis of the unfair and unequal ways in which individual 
autonomy rights are protected. The MCA leaves a number of gaps, which are filled by other statutes 
and common law. Disability and children’s rights campaigners have argued that the reach and 
application of the core principles of the Act should be reconsidered in light of human rights 
advances. Proper implementation of the MCA and our ability to respond to human rights 
developments are dependent upon a wider commitment to empowerment and enablement both 
when the Act applies and in relation to the various laws that govern capacity alongside the MCA.  
III. WAYS FORWARD 
A. The universal capacity model 
One option is to radically reform the MCA. We have seen that the Act as currently framed imposes 
limitations on the extent to which autonomy as an achievement can be fully realised in practice. 
Furthermore, there is a strong argument that the MCA breaches the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities.84 Arguably, the focus in the test for incapacity on cognitive ability leaves 
the decisions of some individuals susceptible to veto on the basis of their status. Accordingly, some 
would argue that the Act gives inadequate protection to individual autonomy rights. 
The Government ratified the CRPD in the belief that the MCA was compatible. But the language of 
the CRPD is open textured and interpretation has tended to follow a bottom-up approach: those 
who are treated differently by virtue of their status interpret the Convention so as to strengthen 
their position. A previous section in this article briefly contemplated the potential for the law’s 
distinction between people with physical disabilities and psychosocial disorders (who may be able to 
make a capax decision under the MCA yet nonetheless be overruled in order to safeguard them from 
harm) to breach Article 12(2)’s promise of capacity on an equal basis as part of the commitment to 
equal recognition before the law.  Interpretation of the CRPD could lead to more radical change still, 
if it is accepted that the focus on mental capacity is fundamentally flawed.  
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Article 12 of the CRPD promises appropriate measures of support in exercising legal capacity85 in line 
with the individual’s ‘will and preferences’.86 In place of mental capacity with its diagnostic87 and 
functional88 tests, a universal model of capacity would recognise that all individuals retain capacity, 
regardless of disability. Decisions would be supported to various (sometimes considerable) degrees 
so that everyone retains the right to make decisions according to their will and preferences. This 
interpretation of the CRPD has led to reforms and reform proposals in a number of countries. By way 
of example, Ireland’s Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill, published in July 2013,89 does not rely 
on the best interests test, proposing instead a model based on will and preferences.   
In April 2014, a General Comment on Article 12 of the CRPD was issued by the United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (the Committee), set up under Article 34 of the 
Convention.90 The Committee is critical of laws that deny legal capacity (ie ‘capacity to be a holder of 
rights and an actor under the law’) on the basis of cognitive impairment: 
[In some countries a] person’s … decision-making skills are taken as legitimate grounds for 
denying his or her legal capacity and lowering his or her status as a person before the law. 
Article 12 does not permit such discriminatory denial of legal capacity, but rather requires 
that support be provided in the exercise of legal capacity.91 
The Committee supports a ‘universal capacity’ approach. The Comment on Article 12 does not refer 
specifically to the Mental Capacity Act, but it is clear that it considers the MCA and similar regimes to 
breach Article 12. The MCA falls foul of the Committee’s interpretation insofar as it recognises that 
some individuals lack mental capacity and that those who do are subject to the decisions of others. 
Radical reform of the MCA in light of the Committee’s Comment would involve England and Wales 
abandoning both the best interests framework and the diagnostic threshold for incapacity.  
B. In defence of the MCA 
The Mental Disability Advocacy Centre submitted evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee 
that the ‘substituted decision-making regime’ is contrary to Article 12 of the CRPD;92  an issue that 
the Select Committee avoided on the basis that the compliance question was being considered by 
the judiciary in England and Wales.93 The Government’s response to the Select Committee report, 
Valuing Every Voice, Respecting Every Right, outlines commitment to the CRPD,94 but it refers 
neither to the UN Committee Comment nor the potential for the MCA to conflict with Article 12. 
Neither is entirely surprising. The Government is not necessarily bound by the Committee’s 
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interpretation and might well disagree with it.95 That is not to say that the UN Committee’s 
Comment has been swept under the carpet: Senior Judge Lush in the Court of Protection recently 
cited it in a case on undue influence,96 and an independent review of the MCA’s compliance with the 
CRPD by the Essex Autonomy Project considered the impact of the Comment when coming to a 
broad consensus (explored below) that the basic architecture of the MCA was compliant but that 
some reform is required.97 
The second part of the title of the government’s response to the Select Committee ‘Making the Case 
for the Mental Capacity Act’ makes the political position clear: the MCA is here to stay. In the UK’s 
first compliance report on the CRPD published in 201198 it is opined that compliance with Article 12 
is achieved through application of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. If the Government maintains this 
position, then one option before it is to diverge from the Committee’s interpretation of Article 12, 
whilst remaining committed to the CRPD.99 Compliance with the Convention requirement to respect 
the individual’s rights, will and preferences might arguably flow from the assertion in section 4(6) of 
the MCA that the decision-maker must ‘consider, so far as is reasonably ascertainable, the person’s 
past and present wishes and feelings … [and] the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence 
his decision if he had capacity’. Safeguards against ‘unequal recognition before the law’ rest on the 
focus in the MCA100 on the assumption of capacity; the decision-specific focus of the test for 
incapacity; and recognition in section 2(3) of the MCA that: 
A lack of capacity cannot be established merely by reference to— 
(a) a person's age or appearance, or 
(b) a condition of his, or an aspect of his behaviour, which might lead others to make 
unjustified assumptions about his capacity.  
The adoption in the MCA of a functional test for incapacity may be more difficult to square with the 
CRPD. Under the MCA, those who lack mental capacity also lack legal capacity to make the relevant 
decision and this may conflict with the universal capacity model upheld in the Convention. However, 
the implications of the denial of legal capacity vary greatly from one jurisdiction to another. The 
Committee argue that:  
[T]here are no circumstances permissible under international human rights law in which a 
person may be deprived of the right to recognition as a person before the law, or in which 
this right may be limited.101 
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In England and Wales, a lack of mental capacity may lead to the patient being denied the right to 
make the decision in question. It does not strip the individual of ‘recognition as a person before the 
law’. The retention of civil rights when a person loses capacity to make a particular decision might be 
said to render any breach of Article 8 of the ECHR proportionate in light of the harmful 
consequences of non-treatment. Contrast this position with regimes where guardianship laws 
remove a person’s legal capacity. On the basis of a person’s status – perhaps a diagnosis of a 
psychosocial disability - they are stripped of their fundamental rights as persons.102 In some 
countries people with certain psychosocial disabilities can be committed to an institution on the 
whim of a relative and their civil rights- their right to marry, vote or found a family – removed.103 
Substituted judgment – a judgment made by one person (or court) on behalf of another – can take a 
variety of forms.  
In England and Wales, the MCA attempts to give effect to the views of the patient in a number of 
ways, including giving force to advance directives104 and allowing the individual to nominate a 
proxy.105 The powers of the proxy decision-maker are limited to decisions that are in the best 
interests of the person, taking into consideration their past and present views.106 Abandoning this 
framework in favour of a supported-decision regime carries risks of its own. One is that it might fall 
perilously close to the same level of substituted decision-making, but under a different name.107 
Those patients who cannot communicate their decision require such a degree of ‘support’ as to 
render dubious any real reliance on their will and preference. 
In conclusion, if the opinion of the UN Committee is accepted, then the MCA breaches Article 12 and 
major legislative reform will follow. If the government decides instead to adopt a contrasting 
interpretation of Article 12, I have outlined the basic factors that would be put forward in support of 
the argument that the MCA is compatible with the CRPD. Scrutiny of the UK’s compliance with the 
Convention by the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2015 will no doubt 
engage with this issue. It is abundantly clear from the 2014 House of Lords Select Committee report 
referred to in the earlier sections of this article, that even if the MCA can be said to comply with the 
CRPD in theory, it does not currently do so in practice. The failure to implement the facilitative ethos 
of the MCA, and the poor articulation in the Act and Code of Practice of the requirement to support 
decision-making108 are out of line with the Convention. Any justification of the current form of 
legislation is dependent on the proper implementation of the MCA.  
An alternative is to retain the MCA framework but subject it to reform. The Essex Autonomy Project 
on ‘Achieving UNCRPD Compliance’109 has come to the conclusion that the Committee is not correct 
in its assertion that compliance with the CRPD is dependent upon the abolition of substitute 
decision-making under the best interests framework. However it recommends that the words 
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‘because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain’ are removed 
from the section 2(1) test for incapacity on the ground that they are discriminatory and in breach of 
Article 5 of the CRPD; and that best interest framework breaches Article 12(4) of the CRPD and 
should be amended to incorporate a rebuttable presumption that a decision should be made in 
accordance with the wishes of the person lacking capacity. 110 This option is attractive but whilst it 
may resolve to the satisfaction of the Government the issue of MCA compatibility, compliance of the 
MHA with the CRPD would remain questionable.  
C. Legislating to harmonise approaches  
The MCA is one of a number of laws that govern capacity to consent to and refuse medical 
treatment. When the MCA was enacted, the exclusion of young people and those with psychosocial 
disabilities was seen as justifiable on the basis that the groups are vulnerable and in need of 
charitable paternalism. We have seen that legal and human rights developments make this position 
increasingly difficult to defend. One option is to retain the current focus of the MCA on mental 
capacity and to retain the best interests framework, but to redesign the suite of laws that govern 
capacity to consent to medical treatment in order to bring about a consistent regime, so responding 
to the criticism that the current regime renders some groups unequal before the law in breach of 
Article 12 of the CRPD. The idea would be to introduce a fused approach to capacity.  
Morrissey has argued that the incorporation of mental health within the CRPD will result in a 
paradigm shift in terms of rights. The provisions of the CRPD, and in particular, the requirement in 
Article 12 that people with disabilities are supported in their exercise of legal capacity, will drive 
mental health reform.111 The argument that two separate schemes for compulsory treatment  - one 
for physical and the other for mental disorder  - is unnecessary and discriminatory is growing in 
force. It is clear that ‘mental disorder’ does not, of itself, signify incapacity. In a 2000 study, capacity 
(as defined in the, then Mental Capacity Bill) was assessed in three different mental disability 
groups.112 Whilst those with learning disabilities and dementia were significantly less likely than the 
general population to have capacity, the same could not be said of the group with mental disorders. 
This was especially so when care was taken to present information to the patient in an appropriate 
form.113  
On the other hand, the MCA test for incapacity does not incorporate those non-autonomous 
decisions that flow from a lack of insight into a psychosocial condition. But this factor does not 
render those with psychosocial disabilities unfit for inclusion within a capacity-based model. A 
solution might be to alter the definition of capacity so that those, whose conditions affect their 
insight, are not viewed as having the requisite capacity. The test would apply to all, as would the 
empowering and enabling ethos of the Act. A number of countries seek to do just that. For example, 
in Australia, Bills in Victoria and Tasmania propose to allow coercive treatment for mental disorder 
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only where the patient lacks legal capacity.114 Szmukler, Daw, and Dawson have outlined a draft 
fused law on capacity and mental health which might be applied in England and Wales.115  The 
proposal is for a unified scheme for incapacity, whether it is caused by learning disability, depression 
or head injury.116 
Fused models incorporating young people are altogether rarer. This reflects the primacy of the best 
interests principle117 in decisions about minors and wide disagreement as to how best to protect 
best interests when young people refuse life-sustaining treatment. The ‘evolving capacities’ 
approach of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child can arguably be accommodated within a 
future-orientated view of autonomy118 in which case refusals of treatment might be overruled to 
protect minors’ ‘best-desire’ or ‘ideal-desire’119 autonomy, rather than their current desire. I have 
argued elsewhere that a sufficiently robust capacity test would protect best interests,120 in which 
case young peoples’ capax decisions should be upheld in the same way as adults’. As we have seen, 
behind the paradigm shift inherent in the CRPD, lies a rejection of charitable paternalism and a new 
focus on enablement. Calling upon the same principles to uphold children’s autonomy rights, could 
to lead to comparable advances.   
There are examples of fused capacity laws that apply to adults and young people. In Ontario, 
Canada, the Health Care Consent Act 1996 operates a presumption of capacity that applies 
irrespective of age and that is accompanied by a duty to facilitate capacity.121 A guide has been 
developed to help doctors apply the test to minors.122 The model is progressive, but some 
commentators fear that a test which fuses adult and child capacity is necessarily broad and can 
therefore leave some adult groups susceptible to a finding of incapacity if the outcome of their 
decision is considered undesirable.123 In other words, a more inclusive test may result in a more 
malleable test which is less protective of individual autonomy. 
Perhaps this consideration was relevant to the rejection in Northern Ireland of the Bamford Review 
proposal to fuse adult and child capacity tests.124 The Review identified the need to move away from 
a status-based test and to recognise the evolving capacities of children. It suggested that a 
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rebuttable presumption of capacity might be applied from age 12-16.125 The capacity test and 
protections would be applied to everyone aged 12 and over, but the rebuttable nature of the test 
would protect the welfare interests of those who lack capacity.   
This section has argued that reform of the MCA to improve compliance with the CRPD would not be 
a panacea. A broader scheme of reform, whilst attractive in principle, is hugely complex in practice. 
In light of this it is perhaps unsurprising that, whilst some states are bravely tackling these issues in 
relation to minors or those with psychosocial disabilities, none have yet proposed a scheme which 
encompasses them both.  
D. Fusion by stealth 
If, as seems likely in the political climate, the broad scheme of the MCA is retained (in preference to 
a new, universal capacity model or a new fused legislative model), compliance with human rights will 
depend on a more gradual means of bringing the various laws into line. In the UK, an empowering 
ethos is making its way into other legislation. The Equality Act 2010 definition of disability 
incorporates both physical and mental impairment.126 And Article 12 of the CRPD has influenced new 
protections for people with disabilities in the Care Act 2014, not least in the establishment of the 
right to an independent advocate.127 There are also signs of changes in clinical practice. For example, 
a spate of cases in the 1990s resulted in non-consensual treatment of minors who withheld their 
consent to life-sustaining treatment. There has been few128 such case since 2003, ostensibly due to 
discomfort with the authoritarian measures it necessitates. There is a preference for persuasion and 
where that fails, a recognition that non-treatment may be in the interests of the minor.129 The 
General Medical Council now endorses a partnership model between doctor and patient. 130 
In case law too, there is evidence of an effort to move the focus from mental capacity as an 
expression of autonomy to capacity as an achievement of autonomy. The case of DL v A Local 
Authority & Others,131 though controversial,132 does incorporate an attempt to move away from a 
dictatorial approach to a more facilitative position. In DL, the Court of Appeal sought to fill a gap left 
by the Mental Capacity Act in a manner commensurate with the principles of the Act. The couple in 
question had capacity according to the test set down in the MCA, but were subject to undue 
influence from their son. The Court ordered that they should be given the opportunity to make a 
                                                          
125
 Ibid, 5.45: ‘The implications of a capacity approach to all substitute decision-making legislation would 
require the same basic approach to be applied for children.  While most people would agree that parents be 
substitute decision-makers for children up to the age of 10 or 12, consideration might be given to a rebuttable 
presumption of capacity between 12 and 16.  …’ 
126
 Equality Act 2010, s 6(1)(a).  
127
 See discussion in Lucy Series’ Blog The Small Places (an excellent resource of commentary and materials on 
mental capacity and the CRPD): accessible at https://thesmallplaces.wordpress.com/2014/06/06/hidden-
gems/ 
128
 An urgent out of hours application to treat a 17 year old girl following a drug overdose was granted in An 
NHS Foundation Hospital v P [2014] EWHC 165. ‘P’ withheld consent and did not lack capacity. Discussed in S. 
Pattinson, Medical Law and Ethics (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed, 2014), 5–029. 
129
 E. Cave, Nuffield Foundation Report: Young People who Refuse Life Sustaining Treatment: A Briefing Paper 
on Current Law and the Need for Reform (April 2013), accessible at 
http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/adolescents-and-informed-consent. 
130
 General Medical Council, Good Medical Practice (Manchester, 2013), paras 46-52. 
131
 [2012] EWCA Civ 25. 
132
 See n31 above. 
20 
 
free and unencumbered decision. McFarlane LJ agreed with the decision of Re SA (Vulnerable Adult 
with Capacity: Marriage) where it was held the inherent jurisdiction is ‘…  aimed at enhancing or 
liberating the autonomy of a vulnerable adult whose autonomy has been compromised by a reason 
other than mental incapacity.’133 The judges did not substitute the couple’s decisions with a court-
imposed welfare decision, but commended a facilitative approach,134 which is ‘entirely on all fours 
with the re-establishment of the individual's autonomy of decision-making in a manner which 
enhances, rather than breaches, their ECHR Article 8 rights’.135 
A similar approach can be discerned in Aintree University Hospital Foundation Trust v James,136 in 
which the Supreme Court emphasised the importance of considering best interests from the 
perspective of the patient. Also, a recent decision in the Court of Protection in Westminster City 
Council v Sykes137  focused on Ms. Manuela Sykes’ will and preferences, wishes and beliefs in coming 
to the decision that she be allowed to return home. And in Re S and S (Protected Persons),138 Judge 
Marshall said that the MCA ‘effectively gives rise to a presumption in favour of implementing [the 
individual’s] wishes, unless there is some potential sufficiently detrimental effect for P of doing so 
which outweighs this.’139 This view is controversial,140 but it signifies an attempt to strengthen 
judicial commitment to the will and preference of those lacking capacity.  
A new age of supported decision-making is upon us, and our ability to implement and extend the 
empowering ethos of the MCA depends not only on a better understanding of the MCA but on a 
willingness to adapt the suite of laws and guidance pertaining to medical treatment decisions.  
CONCLUSION 
The MCA has recently come under intense criticism. The House of Lords Select Committee report 
indicates that seven years after the Act came into force it remains poorly understood and 
implemented. The protections of rights on ‘paper’ are not followed through in practice. The 
Government has acknowledged the failure to properly implement the MCA. It will ‘consider the case’ 
for establishing an independent Mental Capacity Advisory Board to raise awareness and advise the 
Government;141 host a national event to raise awareness;142 and the Department of Health will 
commission a review of its guidance.143 The Government remains firmly committed to the MCA:  
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The Government believes the MCA is an Act of fundamental importance which we are 
committed to embedding across our work programmes.144 
 
It sees the MCA as the mechanism by which to ‘value every voice’ and respect ‘every right of those 
who may lack capacity’.145 This article has argued that this approach is flawed.  First, the dominance 
of individual autonomy renders the MCA limited in its ability to empower individuals. Second, in 
relation to decisions to consent to and refuse medical treatment, the MCA is but one of a number of 
relevant laws. An individual’s decision can be overruled despite being considered capax under the 
Act. Where this is to protect the patient (rather than others) from harm and flows from recognition 
of the person’s vulnerability, there is potential for this to breach Article 12(2) of the CRPD which 
states that ‘States Parties shall recognise that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an 
equal basis with others in all aspects of life’. An emerging body of case law in the European Court of 
Human Rights has focused on States’ tests for capacity.146 Where the test is based on discriminatory 
and out-dated notions that vulnerable people should be subjected to charitable paternalism, there is 
potential for legal challenge. In England and Wales it is also the case that an individual can be 
required to satisfy a different, more stringent test for capacity in which case empowerment and 
facilitation may not be required by law. This is problematic because healthcare professionals are 
then expected to value safeguarding and empowerment to different degrees, depending on the 
status of the patient.  
Implementation of the MCA and compliance with human rights developments require that we 
consider the Act in context. In this article I have focused on the right to consent to and refuse 
medical treatment in order to demonstrate the variable and incoherent ways in which capacity is 
recognised and acted upon. The focus on the Act in isolation ignores the reality that healthcare 
professionals and patients must function in a system where there are in fact a number of different 
tests for capacity and implications flowing from a recognition that a decision is capax. The facilitative 
approach engendered in the MCA is a commendable goal, but its effectiveness is limited by the 
overarching scheme of legal capacity to consent to medical treatment, parts of which are based on 
out-dated notions of paternalism which focus on status as opposed to capability to make an 
autonomous decision.  Even if the proposals for MCA reform put forward by the Essex Autonomy 
Project are accepted, the potential for mental health law to breach the CRPD and for laws relating to 
child consent to conflict with the CRC remains. This is both inherently problematic and a practical 
barrier to implementation of the MCA.  
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